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Abstract: In the last decade, formal methods have proved their interest when
analyzing security protocols. Security protocols require in particular to reason
about the attacker knowledge. Two standard notions are often considered in
formal approaches: deducibility and indistinguishability relations. The first
notion states whether an attacker can learn the value of a secret, while the
latter states whether an attacker can notice some difference between protocol
runs with different values of the secret.
Several decision procedures have been developed so far for both notions but
none of them can be applied in the context of e-voting protocols, which require
dedicated cryptographic primitives. In this work, we show that both deduc-
tion and indistinguishability are decidable in polynomial time for two theories
modeling the primitives of e-voting protocols.
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Décision de la connaissance dans les protocoles
de sécurité pour des théories liées au vote
électronique
Résumé : Les méthodes formelles se sont révélées très utiles dans l’analyse des
protocoles de sécurité. Les protocoles de sécurité demandent en particulier de
pouvoir raisonner finement sur la connaissance d’un attaquant. Deux notions
classiques sont souvent utilisées: la déduction et l’indistinguabilité. La première
notion assure qu’un attaquant ne peut connâıtre la valeur du secret tandis que
la deuxième assure qu’un attaquant ne peut pas faire la différence entre deux
exécutions du protocole avec des valeurs différentes pour le secret.
Plusieurs procédure de décision ont été développées pour les deux notions
mais aucune d’entre elles ne peut s’appliquer au contexte particulier des proto-
coles de vote, qui utilisent des primitives cryptographiques inhabituelles. Dans
cet article, nous montrons que les relations de déduction et d’indistinguabilité
sont toutes deux décidables en temps polynomial, pour deux théories équationnelles
modélisant les primitives cryptographiques utilisées dans le vote électronique.
Mots-clés : protocoles de sécurité, méthodes formelles, décidabilité, vote
électronique, théorie équationnelle, connaissance, deduction, équivalence sta-
tique
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1 Introduction
Security protocols aim at securing communication over public networks. They
achieve various goals such as secrecy, authenticity or anonymity, using crypto-
graphic primitives like encryption and signatures. In the last decade, several
decision procedures have been developed to check the security of cryptographic
protocols. For example, secrecy is NP-complete when limiting the number of
sessions [RT01]. Several tools have been developed for automatically analyzing
security protocols (see e.g. [Bla01, ABB+05]).
In formal approaches, messages sent over a network are modeled by terms
that can be seen as trees labeled by function symbols (like encryption, decryption,
etc.), and whose leaves are data. The cryptographic functions properties are de-
scribed by axioms that define an equational theory. The analysis of protocols
then requires precise formulations of the knowledge (capability) of protocol par-
ticipants and attackers. Many formal definitions explain the knowledge of an
attacker in terms of message deducibility. Intuitively, deducibility focuses on
the following question: given a set of messages φ and a secret s, can an attacker
compute s from φ ?
However, this concept of deducibility is not always suitable for expressing
the knowledge of an attacker. For instance, consider an e-voting protocol that
transmits an encrypted choice value of a vote. In this case, it is not sufficient to
ask whether an attacker can deduce the value, since he knows all possible values
of a vote. A more powerful notion of indistinguishability has been introduced
in the framework of applied pi calculus [AF01]: a secret is preserved if an
attacker can never distinguish between protocol runs with different values of
the secret. This notion is called static equivalence. The term static reflects
the fact that this notion applies only to messages transmitted and ignores the
protocol behavior. Decidability of both deduction and static equivalence have
been studied (e.g. [AC06, Del06, CD07, CLS03]) for several equational theories
including for instance exclusive or, homomorphic operators, blind signatures or
subterm theories.
In this paper, we focus on e-voting protocols, a recent family of proto-
cols. Such protocols should ensure in particular anonymity of the vote, receipt-
freeness and possibly coercion-resistance [DKR09]. They make use of special
cryptographic primitives such as re-encryption or trapdoor commitment. How-
ever none of the previous decidability results can be applied in the context of
e-voting protocols, even for the two key notions of deduction and static equiva-
lence.
We consider two particular equational theories used when modeling e-voting
protocols. The first equational theory, denoted by ELee models the properties
of re-encryption, particularly important in the Lee et al protocol [LBD+03].
The second equational theory, denoted by EOka models the properties of blind
signatures schemes and trapdoor bit commitment scheme, particularly impor-
tant in the Okamoto protocol [Oka96]. Our main contribution is to show that
both deducibility and static equivalence are decidable in polynomial time for
any of these two theories. This is a first (and necessary) step towards a de-
cidability result in the active case. One ingredient of our proof is the locality
property [McA93], for which we design an appropriate notion of subterms. For
static equivalence, our proofs are also inspired from the technique developed
in [AC06] for convergent subterm theories.
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Detailed proof are provided in appendix for the reviewer convenience. They
will appear in a technical report.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we present some basic notions and notations. We suppose the
reader familiar with rewriting systems [DP01].
2.1 Syntax
A signature Σ consists of a finite set of function symbols, each with an arity.
We write ar(f) for the arity of a function symbol f . A function symbol with
arity 0 is a constant symbol. Given a signature Σ, an infinite set of names N ,
and an infinite set of variables, the set of terms is defined by the grammar:
L,M,N, T, U, V ::= terms
k, . . . , n, . . . , s names
x, y, z variables
f(M1, . . . ,Mk) function application
where f ranges over the function symbols of Σ and k matches the arity of f . A
term is closed when it does not have free variables (but it may contain names
and constant symbols). We write fn(M) for the set of names that occur in the
term M.
Given a signature Σ, an infinite set of namesN and an infinite set of variables
X , we denote by T (Σ) (resp. T (Σ,X )) the set of terms over Σ ∪ N (resp.
Σ∪N ∪X . The former is called the set of closed terms over Σ, while the latter
is called the set of terms over Σ. We denote by Σ0 the set of the constant
symbols of Σ. The size |T | of a term T is defined by |T | = 1 if T ∈ X ∪N ∪Σ0
and |f(T1, . . . , Tk)| = 1 +
∑k
i=1 |Ti|. A substitution is a function that maps
variables to terms σ : X → T (Σ,X ). We write σ = {T1/x1, . . . , Tn/xn} to say
that xiσ = Ti for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and xσ = x for x 6= xi. We define the domain of σ,
denoted by dom(σ), to be the set {x ∈ X | xσ 6= x}.
A theory (Σ, E) is defined by a signature Σ and a set of equations E given
by
⋃n
i=1{Mi = Ni} with Mi, Ni ∈ T (Σ,X ). The size of E, is given by cE =
max1≤i≤n(|Mi|, |Ni|, ar(Σ)+1), where ar(Σ) is the maximal arity of a function
symbol in Σ. We simply write E for the theory (Σ, E). The relation =E denotes
the equational theory generated by (Σ, E) on T (Σ,X ), that is an equivalence
relation on terms closed under application of contexts and substitutions. We
use the symbol == to denote syntactic equality between terms.
Let R be a rewrite system. We write U → V if U and V are terms and
U may be rewritten to V (in one step) using a rule of R. As usual, if R is
convergent then U↓ denoted the normal form of U . We write →R instead of
→ when the rewrite system is not clear from the context. If there exists a rule
l → r of the rewriting system R and some substitution θ such that there exist
terms U and V such that U = lθ and V = rθ, then we say that the reduction
U → V occurs in head, and we write U
h
−→ V .
A context C is a term with holes, or (more formally) a term with distin-
guished variables such that each of them occurs at most once in the context.
When C is a context, with n distinguished variables x1, . . . , xn, we may write
C[x1, . . . , xn] instead of C in order to show the variables, and when T1, . . . , Tn
INRIA
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are terms we may also write C[T1, . . . , Tn] for the result of replacing each vari-
able xi with the corresponding term Ti.
2.2 Frames
In the applied pi calculus [AF01], a message sequence is organized into a frame
νñσ, where ñ is a finite set of names (intuitively, the fresh names), ν is the re-
striction operator from the pi calculus, which intuitively introduces fresh names,
and σ is a substitution of the form: {M1/x1, . . . ,Mk/xk} where dom(σ) =
{x1, . . . , xk} and M1, . . . ,Mk are closed terms representing transmitted mes-
sages. If the Mi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n are in normal form, then we say that φ is
in normal form. The variables enable us to refer to each Mi, for example for
keeping track of their order of transmission. The free names, denoted fn(φ), is
defined to be the set {n | n ∈
⋃k
i=1 fn(Mi) and n /∈ ñ}.
2.3 Deduction
Given a theory E and a frame φ that represents the information available to an
attacker, we may ask whether a given closed term M may be deduced from φ.
This relation is written φ ⊢E M (or shortly φ ⊢ M when E is clear from the
context). It is axiomatized by the following rules:
νñ.σ ⊢M
if ∃x ∈ dom(σ) s.t xσ = M
νñ.σ ⊢ s
if s /∈ ñ
φ ⊢M1 φ ⊢Mk
φ ⊢ f(M1, . . . ,Mk)
if f ∈ Σ
φ ⊢M M =E M ′
φ ⊢M ′
Intuitively, the deducible messages are the messages of φ and the names that
are not protected in φ, closed by equality in E and closed by application of
functions. The following proposition provides a characterization of deduction
[AC06].
Proposition 1 Let M be a closed term and φ = νñσ be a frame. Then φ ⊢E M
if and only if there exists a term ζ such that fn(ζ) ∩ ñ = ∅ and ζσ =E M .
Such a term ζ is a recipe of M . It represents the attacker actions in order to ob-
tain M . As an example, consider the equational theory Eenc of pairing and sym-
metric encryption. This signature is Σenc = {pair, enc, fst, snd, dec}. The func-
tion enc(x, y) allows to encrypt a message x by the key y, while dec(enc(x, y), y)
extracts the message x from the ciphertext message enc(x, y) by using the same
key y. The theory Eenc is defined by the axioms :
fst(pair(x, y)) = x snd(pair(x, y)) = y dec(enc(x, y), y) = x
Let φ = νk, s.{enc(s, k)/x, k/y}. Then φ ⊢ k and φ ⊢ s. Furthermore, we
have k =Eenc yφ and s =Eenc dec(x, y)φ. In this case, a possible recipe for
obtaining k is y and a possible recipe for obtaining s is dec(x, y).
2.4 Static equivalence
We say that two terms M and N are equal in the frame φ under a the-
ory E, and write it (M =E N)φ, if and only if φ = νñ.σ, Mσ =E Nσ
RR n° 6903
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, and {ñ} ∩ (fn(M) ∪ fn(N)) = ∅ for some names ñ and substitution σ.
Then we say that two frames φ and ψ are statically equivalent, and write
φ ≈E ψ, when dom(φ) = dom(ψ) and when, for all terms M and N , we have
(M =E N)φ if and only if (M =E N)ψ. For example, consider again the theory
Eenc. Let φ = νk.{enc(s, k)/x, k/y} and ψ = νk.{enc(s′, k)/x, k/y}. We have
(dec(x, y) =Eenc s)φ but not (dec(x, y) =Eenc s)ψ. Therefore φ and ψ are not
statically equivalent.
3 E-voting theories
In this section, we present two e-voting theories: the theory ELee, used for
modeling the properties of the primitives used in the protocol proposed by Lee
et al [LBD+03] and and the theory EOka, used for modeling the properties of the
primitives used in the protocol proposed by Okamoto [Oka96]. Their modeling
has been taken from [DKR09].
3.1 DVP and re-encryption
The protocol due to Lee et al relies on two less used cryptographic primitives:
re-encryption and designated verifier proofs (DVP) of re-encryption. A re-
encryption of a ciphertext (obtained using a randomized encryption scheme)
changes the random coins, without changing or revealing the plaintext. A DVP
of the re-encryption proves that the two ciphertexts contain indeed the same
plaintext. However, a designated verifier proof only convinces one intended
person, e.g., the voter, that the re-encrypted ciphertext contains the original
plaintext. (see [DKR09] for more explanation).
The theory modeling the protocol due to Lee et al, denoted by ELee, is de-
fined by: ΣLee = {getpk, host, pk, checksign, sign, decrypt, rencrypt, penc, dvp,
checkdvp, ok, f0} and the following equations :
(1) getpk(host(x)) = x
(2) checksign(sign(x, y), pk(y)) = x
(3) decrypt(penc(x, pk(y), z), y) = x
(4) rencrypt(penc(x, pk(y), z), w) = penc(x, pk(y), f0(z, w))
(5) checkdvp(dvp(x, rencrypt(x, y), y, pk(z)), x, rencrypt(x, y), pk(z)) = ok
(6) checkdvp(dvp(x, y, z, w), x, y, pk(w)) = ok
The first equation models the fact that we can obtain the public key of each
host (modeled by the functions getpk and host). The second equation models
digital signatures as being signatures with message recovery, it means that the
signature (modeled by the term sign(x, y)) of the message x by the key y, can be
extracted using the checksign function and the public key corresponding to y.
The third equation is used for modeling the asymmetric probabilistic encryption
(modeled by the function penc) using a random coin, while the fourth equation
models the re-encryption (modeled by the function rencrypt), that allows to
obtain a different encryption of the same message with another random coin
which is function of the original one and the one used during the re-encryption.
In the equations (5) and (6), the dvp symbol allows to build a designated verifier
proof of the fact that a message is a re-encryption of another one and checkdvp
symbol allows the designated verifier to check that the proof is valid. Note that
INRIA
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checkdvp also succeeds for a fake dvp created using the designated verifier’s
private key.
We denote by RELee , the convergent rewriting system associated to ELee
(obtained by orienting the equations from left to right and applying the com-
pletion procedure [KB70]), it is defined by:
(1) getpk(host(x))→ x
(2) checksign(sign(x, y), pk(y))→ x
(3) decrypt(penc(x, pk(y), z), y)→ x
(4) rencrypt(penc(x, pk(y), z), w)→ penc(x, pk(y), f0(z, w))
(5) checkdvp(dvp(x, rencrypt(x, z), z, pk(y)), x, rencrypt(x, z), pk(y))→ ok
(6) checkdvp(dvp(penc(x, pk(y), z), penc(x, pk(y), f0(z, w)), w, pk(v)),
penc(x, pk(y), z), penc(x, pk(y), f0(z, w)), pk(v))→ ok
(7) checkdvp(dvp(x, y, z, w), x, y, pk(w))→ ok
3.2 Trapdoor bit-commitment
The protocol due to Okamoto is based on a trap-door bit commitment and
blind signatures. A trap-door bit commitment scheme allows the agent who
has performed the commitment to open it in many ways. Hence, trap-door
bit commitment does not bind the voter to its vote. Blind signature schemes
allow a person to get a message signed by another party without revealing
any information about the message to the other party (see [DKR09] for more
explanation).
The theory modeling the protocol due to Okamoto, denoted by EOka, is
defined by:
ΣOka = {host, getpk, pk, open, sign, checksign, blind, unblind, tdcommit, f1} and
the following axioms :
(1) getpk(host(x)) = x
(2) checksign(sign(x, y), pk(y)) = x
(3) unblind(blind(x, y), y) = x
(4) unblind(sign(blind(x, y), z), y) = sign(x, y)
(5) open(tdcommit(x, y, z), y) = x
(6) tdcommit(x, f1(y, z, w, x), w) = tdcommit(y, z, w)
The equations (1) and (2) modeling public keys and digital signatures are the
same as in previous section. The equations (3) and (4) model blind signatures
[Cha82], allowing a person to get a message signed by another party without
revealing any information about the message to the other party. The functions
blind and unblind are similar to perfect symmetric key encryption. The fourth
equation allows to extract a signature out of a blinded signature, when the
blinding factor is known. Finally, the equations (5) and (6) model trap-door
bit commitment, modeled by the functions tdcommit and open, that are again
similar to perfect symmetric key encryption. The term tdcommit(x, y, z) models
the commitment of the message x under the key y using the trap-door z. The
sixth equation expresses that a commitment tdcommit(y, z, w) can be viewed as
RR n° 6903
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a commitment of any value x. To open this commitment as x one has to know
the key f(y, z, w, x). Note that this is possible only if one knows the key z used
to forge the commitment tdcommit(y, z, w) and the trap-door w.
The main result of [ACD07] ensures that whenever deducibility and static
equivalence are decidable for two disjoint theories1, they are also decidable for
their union. Thus, we decompose EOka into two disjoint sub-theories such that
EOka = E
1
Oka ∪ E
2
Oka, where E
1
Oka is composed of the first four equations,
and E2Oka is composed of the two last equations. We further notice that the
first theory actually corresponds to the equational theory of blind signatures
for which both deduction and static equivalence have been proved decidable in
polynomial time [AC06]. Thus for proving that deduction and static equivalence
are decidable in polynomial time for Okamoto theory, it is sufficient to prove
that both deduction and static equivalence are decidable in polynomial time for
E2Oka since the combining algorithm of [ACD07] is done in polynomial time.
In the next we simply write EOka instead of E
2
Oka when it is clear from con-
text, which is defined by the five-th and sex-th equations. The rewriting system
associated to EOka, obtained by orienting the equations from left to right is not
convergent. For make it convergent we add the two next equations:
open(tdcommit(y, z, w), f1(y, z, w, x))→ x
f1(x0, f1(x, y, z, x0), z, x1)→ f1(x, y, z, x1)
The first rule is added by the completion algorithm [KB70] , and the second
equation models the property of transitivity of the key used in the commitment.
The convergent rewriting system associated to EOka, denoted by REOka , is
defined by the following rewrite rules:
(1) open(tdcommit(x, y, z), y)→ x
(2) tdcommit(x, f1(y, z, w, x), w)→ tdcommit(y, z, w)
(3) open(tdcommit(y, z, w), f1(y, z, w, x))→ x
(4) f1(x0, f1(x, y, z, x0), z, x1)→ f1(x, y, z, x1)
4 Decidability of deduction
In this section we study the decidability of deduction for both theories. In
the remaining of the paper, E denotes any of the two theories ELee or EOka.
Omitted proofs (under each theory) are given separately in appendix.
Our starting point is the locality technique introduced by [McA93], and used
in [CLS03, CKRT05, LLT05, Del06]. Given a frame φ, a closed term M and
a theory E, the proof of φ ⊢E M is local if it involves only terms in the set
of subterms of φ ∪ {M} w.r.t an appropriate notion of subterms StE . The set
StE(φ ∪ {M}) is also denoted by StE(φ,M). Thus, we define an appropriate
notion of subterms for each theory, that we use for proving the locality property.
Definition 1 Let M1, . . . ,Mk ∈ T (ΣLee,X ). The appropriate notion of sub-
terms for ELee, simply denoted by StLee, is defined as follows: StLee(u) = u when u is a variable or a name,
1Two theories are disjoint if they do not have common function symbols.
INRIA
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StLee(M1)∪StLee(pk(M2))∪StLee(f0(M3,M4))∪{penc(M1, pk(M2),M3)}, StLee(sign(M1,M2)) = {sign(M1,M2)} ∪ StLee(M1) ∪ StLee(pk(M2)), StLee(f(M1, . . . ,Mk)) = {f(M1, . . . ,Mk)} ∪⋃ki=1 StLee(Mi) otherwise
Definition 2 Let M1, . . . ,Mk ∈ T (ΣOka,X ). The appropriate notion of sub-
terms for EOka, simply denoted by StOka, is defined as follows: StOka(u) = u when u is a variable or a name StOka(f1(M1,M2,M3,M4)) = {f1(M1,M2,M3,M4)} ∪⋃4
i=1 StOka(Mi) ∪ {tdcommit(M1,M2,M3)} StOka(f(M1, . . . ,Mk)) = {f(M1, . . . ,Mk)} ∪⋃ki=1 StOka(Mi) otherwise
The following lemma states the locality property for both theories.
Lemma 1 (locality)
Let φ = νñσ be a frame in normal form, M be a closed term in normal form.
If φ ⊢E M then there exists a term ζM , called local recipe, such that: fn(ζM ) ∩ ñ = ∅ and ζMσ =E M . for all ζ′ ∈ StE(ζM ), for all ζ′′ ∈ StE(ζ′) we have ζ′′σ↓ ∈ StE(φ, ζ′σ↓) ∪
{Σ0}. Moreover, if ζ′′ = f(ζ1, . . . , ζk) and f(ζ1σ↓, . . . , ζkσ↓)
h
−→ ζ′′σ↓ by
applying a subterm rule 2 then we have ζ′′σ↓ ∈ StE(φ) ∪ {Σ0}.
The algorithm allowing to decide φ ⊢E M (Algorithm 1), is inspired from
the frame saturation algorithm introduced in [AC06]. The idea is to compute
by saturation all subterms of φ and M that are deducible from φ.
Algorithm 1: Algorithm of Deduction
Input: φ = νen.{M1/x1, . . . , Mk/xk},M
Output: true/false
S := StE(φ, M) ∪ Σ0 ∪ fn(φ)
T := {(Mi, xi) | i ∈ {1..k}} ∪ {(n, n) | n ∈ Σ0 ∪ fn(φ)}1
T ′ := ∅
while T 6= T ′ do
T ′ := T
for all (t1, ζ1) . . . , (tn, ζn) ∈ T
′ and for every function symbol f do
if f(t1, . . . , tn)
h
−→ t and t ∈ S and t /∈ {t | (t, ζt) ∈ T} then2
(t, f(ζ1, . . . , ζn)) ∈ T
if t = f(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ S and t /∈ {t | (t, ζt) ∈ T} then3
(t, f(ζ1, . . . , ζn)) ∈ T
if (M, ζM ) ∈ T then
return true
else
return false
2A rule l → r is called subterm rule if r ∈ StE(l) or r is constant symbol.
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This algorithm terminates since we add only subterms of φ and M .
The next proposition shows correctness and completeness of the algorithm
for the subterms of a frame φ and a closed term M . Moreover, the recipes
computed by the algorithm are minimal and local.
Proposition 2 Let φ = νñσ be a frame such that σ = {M1/x1, . . . ,Mk/xk} is
in normal form, M be a term in normal form and T be the set computed by the
Algorithm 1.
1. ∀M ′ ∈ StE(φ,M) we have φ ⊢E M ′ iff there exists a pair (M ′, ζM ′) ∈ T .
2. Moreover, the recipe ζM ′ computed by the algorithm is minimal and local.
Corollary 1 For every frame φ in normal form and for every closed term M
in normal form, φ ⊢E M is decidable.
Proof. Trivial from proposition 2 (the first part) since M ∈ StE(φ,M). 
The complexity results for deduction and static equivalence are usually given
as functions of the DAG-size of the terms. Our notion of DAG-size does not
correspond to the usual DAG-size of a term since our notion of subterms is
an extension of syntactic subterms. Here, we define the DAG-size of a term
M , denoted |M |dag, to be the number of distinct subterms w.r.t StE . Both
deduction and static equivalence are decidable in polynomial time.
Proposition 3 Let φ = νñσ be a frame in normal form and M be a closed
term in normal form.
1. φ ⊢E M can be decided in time O((|φ|dag + |M |dag)ar(Σ)+2).
2. If φ ⊢E M , then there exits a local recipe ζM such that fn(ζM ) ∩ ñ = ∅,
ζMσ =E M and |ζM |dag ≤ |φ|dag + |M |dag.
5 Decidability of static equivalence
This section is devoted to the proof of the decidability of static equivalence.
Our approach is based on the result of [AC06] for convergent subterm theories.
Intuitively, the idea consists in associating to each frame a finite set of equalities
(modulo renaming) such that two frames are equivalent if and only if each frame
satisfies the equalities of the other’s set. Given a frame φ and a theory E, the
construction of the set of equalities that characterizes a frame is based on the
recipes of elements of a special set satE(φ) representing all deducible subterms
of φ. In our approach, we extend the set satE(φ) by an additional finite set
of terms called critical terms, denoted by IE(φ). We call them critical terms
because they can contribute to the distinction between two frames. Given a
frame φ, we simply write satLee(φ) and satOka(φ) (resp. ILee(φ) and IOka(φ))
for the set satE(φ) (resp. IE(φ)) computed under ELee and EOka respectively.
Our algorithm consists in three steps.
Step 1: saturating frame We compute the set satE(φ) of deducible sub-
terms of φ.
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Definition 3 Let φ = νñ.{M1/x1, . . . ,Mn/xn} be a frame in normal form. Let
StE(φ) be the set of subterms of the terms Mi. The set satE(φ) is defined by
satE(φ) = {M | φ ⊢E M and M ∈ StE(φ) ∪ Σ0 ∪ fn(φ)}
The set satE(φ) can be computed using Algorithm 1.
Step 2: adding critical terms We define the set IE(φ) for each theory.
Definition 4 Let φ = νñ.{M1/x1, . . . ,Mn/xn} be a frame in normal form.
The set ILee(φ) is the minimal set such that: If M1,M2,M3 ∈ satLee(φ), M is
deducible from φ and M ∈ StLee(penc(M1,M2,M3)) then M ∈ ILee(φ).
Proposition 4 Let φ = νñσ be a frame in normal form.
1. The set satLee(φ) ∪ ILee(φ) can be computed in time O(|φ|
2cELee+3
dag ).
2. For every M ∈ satLee(φ) ∪ ILee(φ), there exists a term ζM such that
fn(ζM ) ∩ ñ = ∅, ζMσ =ELee M , and |ζM |dag ≤ |φ|dag(cELee + 1).
For the EOka theory, we do not need to add critical terms, that is, we consider
IOka(φ) = ∅.
In what follows, for each frame φ we assume fixed the set of local recipes
computed by Algorithm 1, denoted by L(φ), that corresponds to the terms of
satE(φ) ∪ IE(φ).
Step 3: introducing a finite set of equalities We associate to each
frame a finite number of equalities EqE(φ).
Definition 5 Let φ = νñσ be a frame in normal form. The set EqE(φ) is the
set of equalities
C1[ζM1 , . . . , ζMk ] = C2[ζM ′1 , . . . , ζM ′l ]
such that (C1[ζM1 , . . . , ζMk ] =E C2[ζM ′1 , . . . , ζM ′l ])φ, |C1|, |C2| ≤ cE, Mi,M
′
i ∈
satE(φ) ∪ IE(φ) and ζMi , ζM ′i ∈ L(φ) ∪ dom(σ). If φ
′ is a frame such that
(M =E N)φ
′ for every (M = N) ∈ EqE(φ), we write φ
′ |= EqE(φ).
Decidability result: Static equivalence is decidable in polynomial time under
both theories. We show (proposition 5) that it is actually sufficient to check for
the set of equalities EqE(φ), that is φ ≈E φ′ if and only if φ |= EqE(φ′) and
φ′ |= EqE(φ). The proof relies on the two following (key) lemmas.
Lemma 2 Let φ = νñσ be a frame in normal form, ζM and ζN be local recipes
of some term T , i.e. ζMσ↓ = ζNσ↓ = T . For every frame φ′ such that φ′ |=
EqE(φ), we have (ζM =E ζN )φ
′.
Lemma 3 Let φ = νñσ be a frame in normal form, M be a deducible term
in normal form and ζM a recipe of M . Then there exists a local recipe of M ,
denoted by ζ̂M , such that for every frame φ
′ such that φ′ |= EqE(φ), we have
(ζM =E ζ̂M )φ
′.
The two lemmas allow us to conclude that it is sufficient to check small equalities.
Proposition 5 Let φ and φ′ be two frames in normal form. We have φ ≈E φ′
if and only if φ |= EqE(φ′) and φ′ |= EqE(φ).
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Proof. (→) By Definition of static equivalence if φ ≈E φ
′ then φ |= EqE(φ
′)
and φ′ |= EqE(φ).
(←) Assume that φ′ |= EqE(φ) and consider M , N such that there exists
ñ, σ such that φ = νñσ, (fn(M) ∪ fn(N)) ∩ ñ = ∅ and (M =E N)φ. Then
Mσ =E Nσ, so (Mσ)↓ == (Nσ)↓. Let us show that (M =E N)φ′. Let
T = (Mσ)↓. The terms M and N can be viewed as recipes of T. By lemma 3
there exists M̂, N̂ such that (M̂ =E M)φ
′ and (N̂ =E N)φ
′. Then, by lemma
2 we obtain that (M̂ =E N̂)φ
′, thus we conclude by transitivity.
Conversely, if (M =E N)φ
′ and φ |= EqE(φ′), we can prove that (M =E N)φ.
We conclude φ ≈E φ
′. 
Theorem 1 Let φ, φ′ be two frames in normal form. φ ≈E φ′ is decidable in
polynomial time.
Proof. The deciding procedure of static equivalence proceeds in two steps.
Firstly, we construct satE(φ) ∪ IE(φ) and satE(φ′) ∪ IE(φ′). In the second
step, we construct the sets EqEE (φ) and EqEE (φ
′). Finally, and according
to proposition 5, we test if each frame satisfy the equality from other’s set.
Moreover, according to the proposition 4, the construction of satE(φ) ∪ IE(φ)
and satE(φ
′) ∪ IE(φ
′) can be done in polynomial time and for each term M
of satE(φ) ∪ IE(φ) or satE(φ′) ∪ IE(φ′), the term ζM has a polynomial DAG-
size. Thus, we can prove, like in [AC06], that this procedure can be done in
polynomial time (in the DAG-size of inputs terms). 
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proved that deduction and static equivalence are both
decidable in polynomial time for two important equational theories: Lee et al
and Okamoto theories. Decidability of deduction relies on the existence of a
locality property with respect to an appropriate notion of subterms that we
have defined for each theory. Decidability of static equivalence relies on result
of [AC06] for convergent subterms theories and a special set of critical terms that
we have introduced. For Okamoto theory we have applied a modular approach
by using the combining algorithm of [ACD07]. A further work is to generalize
the construction of critical terms in order to deal with a wider class of e-voting
theories. As emphasized in introduction, our work is dedicated to the passive
case, where an attacker can simply eavesdrop the communication in order to
get some information. An important (and involved) development of our work is
to design a decision procedure in the active case, where the adversary can fully
interact with the protocol.
Acknowledgment. Many thanks to Stéphanie Delaune for suggestions and inter-
esting help.
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INRIA
Deciding knowledge under e-voting theories 13
Tool for the automated validation of internet security protocols and
applications. In K. Etessami and S. Rajamani, editors, 17th In-
ternational Conference on Computer Aided Verification, CAV’2005,
volume 3576 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 281–285,
Edinburgh, Scotland, 2005. Springer.
[AC04] M. Abadi and V. Cortier. Deciding knowledge in security proto-
cols under equational theories. In Proc. 31st Int. Coll. Automata,
Languages, and Programming (ICALP’2004), volume 3142 of Lec-
ture Notes in Computer Science, pages 46–58, Turku, Finland, July
2004. Springer.
[AC06] M. Abadi and V. Cortier. Deciding knowledge in security proto-
cols under equational theories. Theoretical Computer Science, 387(1-
2):2–32, November 2006.
[ACD07] M. Arnaud, V. Cortier, and S. Delaune. Combining algorithms for
deciding knowledge in security protocols. In Proceedings of the 6th
International Symposium on Frontiers of Combining Systems (Fro-
CoS’07), volume 4720 of Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence,
pages 103–117, Liverpool, UK, September 2007. Springer.
[AF01] M. Abadi and C. Fournet. Mobile values, new names, and secure
communication. In Proc. of the 28th ACM Symposium on Princi-
ples of Programming Languages (POPL’01), pages 104–115, January
2001.
[Bla01] B. Blanchet. An efficient cryptographic protocol verifier based on
prolog rules. In Proc. of the 14th Computer Security Foundations
Workshop (CSFW’01), Cape Breton, Nova Scotia, Canada, June
2001. IEEE Computer Society Press.
[CD07] V. Cortier and S. Delaune. Deciding knowledge in security proto-
cols for monoidal equational theories. In 14th International Con-
ference on Logic for Programming, Artificial Intelligence, and Rea-
soning (LPAR’07), volume 4790 of LNAI, pages 196–210. Springer,
2007.
[Cha82] D. Chaum. Blind signatures for untraceable payments. In CRYPTO,
pages 199–203, 1982.
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Appendix
A Proofs of Section 4
We introduce the definition of a term by composition and a term by decompo-
sition.
Definition 6 Let E be a theory, φ = νñσ be a frame in normal form, and
t, ti ∈ T (Σ,X ) for i = 1..k be non closed terms, we say that: t is a term by decomposition if t def= f(t1, . . . , tk) and
f(t1σ↓, . . . , tkσ↓)
h
−→E tσ↓, t is a term by composition if t is a variable or if t def= f(t1, . . . , tk) and
f(t1σ↓, . . . , tkσ↓) == tσ↓.
Let M be a term, head(M) denotes the head function symbol of M .
A.1 Proofs under Lee et al theory
The next lemma will be used in the proof of locality lemma.
Lemma 4 Let RELee be the convergent rewriting system associated to ELee.
Let M,M1, . . . ,Mk be terms in normal form. If f(M1, . . . ,Mk) is not in normal
form, then we have M = f(M1, . . . ,Mk)↓ iff f(M1, . . . ,Mk)
h
−→M .
Proof. (→) Let M1, . . . ,Mk are in normal form, f(M1, . . . ,Mk) is not in nor-
mal form, and f(M1, . . . ,Mk) →∗ M . Since M1, . . . ,Mk are in normal form,
then the first step of reduction is in head. If the rule (1), (2), (3), (5), (6)
or (7) is applied then it is clear that the term obtained is in normal form. If
the rule (4) is applied, it is easy to verify that penc(M1, pk(M2), f0(M3,M4))
is in normal form whenever penc(M1, pk(M2),M3) and M4 are in normal form.
Then whatever the rule applied, we obtain always a term in normal form. Thus
f(M1, . . . ,Mk)
h
−→ M ′ with M’ in normal form. Since RELee is convergent, we
conclude that M=M’.
(←) If f(M1, . . . ,Mk)
h
−→M , then by definition of ↓ we have f(M1, . . . ,Mk)↓ =
M .  Proof of lemma 1
By proposition of characterization of deduction (proposition 1), there exists a
term ζM satisfying the first condition. We choose one whose size is minimal.
The second condition is proved by induction on the size of ζM .
Base case : ζM is a variable or a name, then the second condition hold
since StLee(ζM ) = {ζM}.
Induction step: Let ζM = f(ζ1, . . . , ζk) with ζi are the minimal recipes
of ζiσ↓. By induction hypothesis we have for all ζ′ ∈ StLee(ζi)i=1..k, for
all ζ′′ ∈ StLee(ζ′) we have ζ′′σ↓ ∈ StLee(φ, ζ′σ↓) ∪ {Σ0Lee}. To conclude
that for all ζ′′ ∈ StLee(ζ′) we have ζ′′σ↓ ∈ StLee(φ, ζ′σ↓) ∪ {Σ0Lee} for any
ζ′ ∈ StLee(ζM ), it is sufficient to show for all ζ′′ ∈ StLee(ζM ), we have ζ′′σ↓ ∈
StLee(φ,M) ∪ {Σ0Lee}. For this, it is sufficient to prove that for all i = 1..k we
have ζiσ↓ ∈ StLee(φ,M) ∪ {Σ0Lee}, since if ζiσ↓ ∈ StLee(φ,M) ∪ {Σ0Lee} then
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for all ζ′′ ∈ StLee(ζi) we have ζ
′′σ↓ ∈ StLee(φ, ζiσ↓) ∪ {Σ0Lee} ⊆ StLee(φ,M) ∪
{Σ0Lee}.
- If f(ζ1σ↓, . . . , ζkσ↓) is in normal form, then for all i = 1..k we have
ζiσ↓ ∈ StLee(f(ζ1σ↓, . . . , ζkσ↓)) and we conclude.
- If f(ζ1σ↓, . . . , ζkσ↓) is not in normal form. Since ζ1σ↓, . . . , ζkσ↓ are in
normal form then by lemma 4 we have f(ζ1σ↓, . . . , ζkσ↓)
h
−→M , in this case we
distinguish five cases according to f : If f = checkdvp, this case cannot appear by minimality of ζM , indeed ok
would be a recipe smaller than ζM . If f = getpk, this implies k=1, so we have ζM = getpk(ζ1) and since ζMσ
is reduced then head(ζ1σ↓) = host. We distinguish several cases for ζ1.
– ζ1 is a variable, so we have ζ1σ↓ ∈ StLee(φ), and since the applied
rule is a subterm rule then M ∈ StLee(ζ1σ↓) ⊆ StLee(φ), thus we
conclude.
– ζ1 = g(ζ
′
1, . . . , ζ
′
k) and g(ζ
′
1σ↓, . . . , ζ
′
kσ↓)
h
−→ ζ1σ↓ by applying a rule
different from (4). Then by induction hypothesis we have ζ1σ↓ ∈
StLee(φ)∪{Σ0Lee}, and since the applied rule is a subterm rule then
M ∈ StLee(ζ1σ↓) ⊆ StLee(φ) ∪ {Σ0Lee}, thus we conclude. If the
rule (4) is applied, this case cannot appear because this implies
head(ζ1σ↓) = penc and by equational theory ζMσ cannot reduced,
contradiction.
– ζ1 = g(ζ
′
1, . . . , ζ
′
k) and g(ζ
′
1σ↓, . . . , ζ
′
kσ↓) is in normal form with g 6=
host, this case cannot appear because this implies that ζMσ cannot
reduced, contradiction.
– ζ1 = host(ζ
′
1), this case cannot appear by minimality of ζM , because
we have always ζ′1 smaller than ζM . f = checksign, this implies k=2, so we have ζM = checksign(ζ1, ζ2) and
since ζMσ is reduced then head(ζ1σ↓) = sign and ζ2σ↓ ∈ StLee(ζ1σ↓).
Thus it is sufficient to prove that ζ1σ↓ ∈ StLee(φ,M). We distinguish
several cases for ζ1.
– ζ1 is a variable, so we have ζ1σ↓ ∈ StLee(φ), and since the applied
rule is a subterm rule then M ∈ StLee(ζ1σ↓) ⊆ StLee(φ), thus we
conclude.
– ζ1 = g(ζ
′
1, . . . , ζ
′
k) and g(ζ
′
1σ↓, . . . , ζ
′
kσ↓)
h
−→ ζ1σ↓ by applying a rule
different from (4). Then by induction hypothesis we have ζ1σ↓ ∈
StLee(φ)∪{Σ0Lee}, and since the applied rule is a subterm rule then
M ∈ StLee(ζ1σ↓) ⊆ StLee(φ) ∪ {Σ0Lee}, thus we conclude. If the
rule (4) is applied, this case cannot appear because this implies
head(ζ1σ↓) = penc and by equational theory ζMσ cannot reduced,
contradiction.
– ζ1 = g(ζ
′
1, . . . , ζ
′
k) and g(ζ
′
1σ↓, . . . , ζ
′
kσ↓) is in normal form with g 6=
sign, this case cannot appear because this implies that ζMσ cannot
reduced, contradiction.
INRIA
Deciding knowledge under e-voting theories 17
– ζ1 = sign(ζ
′
1, ζ
′
2), this case cannot appear by minimality of ζM , be-
cause we have always ζ′1 smaller than ζM . If f = rencrypt, this implies k=2, so we have ζM = rencrypt(ζ1, ζ2) and
since ζMσ is reduced then head(ζ1σ↓) = penc. By Definition of subterms,
we know that ζ1σ↓, ζ2σ↓ ∈ StLee(M), then we conclude. If f = decrypt, this implies k=2, so we have ζM = decrypt(ζ1, ζ2) and
since ζMσ is reduced then head(ζ1σ↓) = penc and ζ2σ↓ ∈ StLee(ζ1σ↓).
Thus it is sufficient to prove that ζ1σ↓ ∈ StLee(φ,M). We distinguish
several cases for ζ1.
– ζ1 is a variable, so we have ζ1σ↓ ∈ StLee(φ),and since the applied
rule is a subterm rule then M ∈ StLee(ζ1σ↓) ⊆ StLee(φ), thus we
conclude.
– ζ1 = g(ζ
′
1, . . . , ζ
′
k) and g(ζ
′
1σ↓, . . . , ζ
′
kσ↓)
h
−→ ζ1σ↓ by applying a rule
different from (4). Then by induction hypothesis we have ζ1σ↓ ∈
StLee(φ)∪{Σ0Lee}, and since the applied rule is a subterm rule then
M ∈ StLee(ζ1σ↓) ⊆ StLee(φ) ∪ {Σ0Lee}, thus we conclude.
– ζ1 = rencrypt(ζ
′
1, ζ
′
2) and rencrypt(ζ
′
1σ↓, ζ
′
2σ↓)
h
−→ ζ1σ↓. This case
cannot appear by minimality of ζM , because we have always
decrypt(ζ′1, ζ2) smaller than ζM .
– ζ1 = g(ζ
′
1, . . . , ζ
′
k) and g(ζ
′
1σ↓, . . . , ζ
′
kσ↓) is in normal form with g 6=
penc, this case cannot appear because this implies that ζMσ cannot
reduced, contradiction.
– ζM1 = penc(ζ
′
1, pk(ζ
′
2), ζ
′
3). This case cannot appear by minimality of
ζM , because we have ζ
′
1 smaller than ζM . 
A.2 Proofs under Okamoto theory
Lemma 5 Let REOka be the convergent rewriting system associated to EO. Let
M,M1, . . . ,Mk be terms in normal form. If f(M1, . . . ,Mk) is not in normal
form, then we have M = f(M1, . . . ,Mk)↓ iff f(M1, . . . ,Mk)
h
−→M .
Proof. (→) Let M1, . . . ,Mk are in normal form, f(M1, . . . ,Mk) is not in normal
form, and f(M1, . . . ,Mk) →∗ M . Since M1, . . . ,Mk are in normal form, then
the first step of reduction is in head. If the rule (1) or (3) is applied then it is
clear that the term obtained is in normal form. It remains the cases of the rules
(2) and (4). Let us examine these two cases: For the case when the rule (2) is applied. Let M ′1,M ′2 be a terms such that
tdcommit(M1,M2,M3)
h
−→ tdcommit(M ′1,M
′
2,M3) with M2 is of the form
f1(M
′
1,M
′
2,M3,M1). The only case in which the term tdcommit(M
′
1,M
′
2,M3)
can be reduce is when M ′2 is of the form f1(M
′′
1 ,M
′′
2 ,M3,M
′
1) for some
termsM ′′1 ,M
′′
2 . But in such case, we haveM2 = f1(M
′
1, f1(M
′′
1 ,M
′′
2 ,M3,M
′
1),M3,M)
(for some term M) is not in normal form, contradiction. Thus we conclude
that tdcommit(M ′1,M
′
2,M3) is always in normal form. For the case when the rule (4) is applied. We have f1(M1,M2,M3,M4) h−→
f1(M
′
1,M
′
2,M3,M4) with M2 is of the form f1(M
′
1,M
′
2,M3,M1). The only
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case in which f1(M
′
1,M
′
2,M3,M4) not in normal form, is the case when
M ′2 is of the form f1(M
′′
1 ,M
′′
2 ,M3,M
′
1) for some terms M
′′
1 ,M
′′
2 . But in
such case, we have M2 = f1(M
′
1, f1(M
′′
1 ,M
′′
2 ,M3,M
′
1),M3,M1) is not in
normal form, contradiction. Thus we conclude that if we applied the rule
(4) on the terms in normal form, we obtain always a term in normal form.
Then whatever the rule applied, we obtain always a term in normal form.
Thus f(M1, . . . ,Mk)
h
−→M ′ with M’ in normal form. SinceREOka is convergent,
we conclude that M=M’.
(←) If f(M1, . . . ,Mk)
h
−→M , then by definition of ↓ we have f(M1, . . . ,Mk)↓ =
M . 
Proof of lemma 1
By proposition 1, there exists a term ζM satisfying the first condition. We
choose one whose size is minimal. The second condition is proved by induction
on the size of ζM .
Base case : ζM is a variable or a name, then the second condition hold
since StOka(ζM ) = {ζM}.
Induction step: Let ζM = f(ζ1, . . . , ζk) with ζi are the minimal recipes
of ζiσ↓. By induction hypothesis we have for all ζ′ ∈ StOka(ζi)i=1..k, for
all ζ′′ ∈ StOka(ζ′) we have ζ′′σ↓ ∈ StOka(φ, ζ′σ↓). To conclude that for all
ζ′′ ∈ StOka(ζ′) we have ζ′′σ↓ ∈ StOka(φ, ζ′σ↓) for any ζ′ ∈ StOka(ζM ), it is suf-
ficient to show for all ζ′′ ∈ StOka(ζM ), we have ζ′′σ↓ ∈ StOka(φ,M). For this,
it is sufficient to prove that for all i = 1..k we have ζiσ↓ ∈ StOka(φ,M), since if
ζiσ↓ ∈ StOka(φ,M) then for all ζ
′ ∈ StOka(ζi) we have ζ
′σ↓ ∈ StOka(φ, ζiσ↓) ⊆
StOka(φ,M).
- If f(ζ1σ↓, . . . , ζkσ↓) is in normal form, so for all i = 1..k we have
ζiσ↓ ∈ StOka(f(ζ1σ↓, . . . , ζkσ↓)) and we conclude.
- If f(ζ1σ↓, . . . , ζkσ↓) is not in normal form. Since ζ1σ↓, . . . , ζkσ↓ are in
normal form then by lemma 5 we have f(ζ1σ↓, . . . , ζkσ↓)
h
−→M , in this case we
distinguish some cases according to the rule applied: If the rule (1) is applied, then we have ζM = open(ζ1, ζ2). Since ζMσ
is reduced to its normal form, then head(ζ1σ↓) = tdcommit and ζ2σ↓ ∈
StOka(ζ1σ↓). Thus it is sufficient to prove that ζ1σ↓ ∈ StOka(φ,M). We
distinguish several cases for ζ1:
– ζ1 is a variable, then ζ1σ↓ ∈ StOka(φ), and since the applied rule is a
subterm rule then M ∈ StOka(ζ1σ↓) ⊆ StOka(φ), thus we conclude.
– ζ1 = tdcommit(ζ
′
1, ζ
′
2, ζ
′
3). This case cannot appear by minimality of
ζM because we have always ζ
′
1 smaller than ζM .
– ζ1 = g(ζ
′
1, . . . , ζ
′
k) and g(ζ
′
1σ↓, . . . , ζ
′
kσ↓) is in normal form with g 6=
tdcommit, this case cannot appear because this implies that ζMσ
cannot reduced, contradiction.
– ζ1 = g(ζ
′
1, . . . , ζ
′
k) and g(ζ
′
1σ↓, . . . , ζ
′
kσ↓)
h
−→ ζ1σ↓ by applying a rule
different from (4). Then by induction hypothesis we have ζ1σ↓ ∈
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StOka(φ)∪{Σ0Oka}, and since the applied rule is a subterm rule then
M ∈ StOka(ζ1σ↓) ⊆ StOka(φ) ∪ {Σ0Oka}, thus we conclude. If the
rule (4) is applied, this case cannot appear because this implies
head(ζ1σ↓) = f1, thus by equational theory ζMσ cannot reduced,
contradiction. If the rule (2) is applied, then we have ζM = tdcommit(ζ1, ζ2, ζ3). Since
ζMσ is reduced to its normal form, then head(ζ2σ↓) = f1 and ζ1σ↓, ζ3σ↓ ∈
StOka(ζ2σ↓). Thus it is sufficient to prove that ζ2σ↓ ∈ StOka(φ,M). We
distinguish several cases for ζ2:
– ζ2 is a variable, then ζ2σ↓ ∈ StOka(φ), and since the applied rule is a
subterm rule then M ∈ StOka(ζ2σ↓) ⊆ StOka(φ), thus we conclude.
– ζ2 = f1(ζ
′
1, ζ
′
2, ζ
′
3, ζ
′
4). This case cannot appear by minimality of ζM
because we have always tdcommit(ζ′1, ζ
′
2, ζ
′
3) smaller than ζM .
– ζ2 = g(ζ
′
1, . . . , ζ
′
k) and g(ζ
′
1σ↓, . . . , ζ
′
kσ↓) is in normal form with g 6=
f1, this case cannot appear because this implies that ζMσ cannot
reduced, contradiction.
– ζ2 = g(ζ
′
1, . . . , ζ
′
k) and g(ζ
′
1σ↓, . . . , ζ
′
kσ↓)
h
−→ ζ1σ↓ by applying the
rule (1) or (3). Then by induction hypothesis we have ζ1σ↓ ∈
StOka(φ) ∪ {Σ0Oka}, and since the applied rule is a subterm rule
then
M ∈ StOka(ζ2σ↓) ⊆ StOka(φ) ∪ {Σ0Oka}, thus we conclude. If
the rule (2) is applied, this case cannot appear because this implies
head(ζ2σ↓) = tdcommit, thus by equational theory ζMσ cannot re-
duced, contradiction.
– If ζ2σ↓ is obtained by the rule (4), i.e. ζ2 = f1(ζ′1, ζ
′
2, ζ
′
3, ζ
′
4). This
case cannot appear by minimality of ζM , because we have always
tdcommit(ζ′1, ζ
′
2, ζ3) smaller than ζM . If the rule (3) is applied, then we have ζM = open(ζ1, ζ2). Since ζMσ is
reduced to its normal form then head(ζ2σ↓) = f1 and ζ1σ↓ ∈ StOka(ζ2σ↓).
Thus it is sufficient to prove that ζ2σ↓ ∈ StOka(φ,M). We distinguish
several cases for ζ2:
– ζ2 is a variable, then ζ2σ↓ ∈ StOka(φ), and since the applied rule is a
subterm rule then M ∈ StOka(ζ2σ↓) ⊆ StOka(φ), thus we conclude.
– ζ2 = f1(ζ
′
1, ζ
′
2, ζ
′
3, ζ
′
4). This case cannot appear by minimality of ζM
because we have always ζ′4 smaller than ζM .
– ζ2 = g(ζ
′
1, . . . , ζ
′
k) and g(ζ
′
1σ↓, . . . , ζ
′
kσ↓) is in normal form with g 6=
f1, this case cannot appear because this implies that ζMσ cannot
reduced, contradiction.
– ζ2 = g(ζ
′
1, . . . , ζ
′
k) and g(ζ
′
1σ↓, . . . , ζ
′
kσ↓)
h
−→ ζ1σ↓ by applying the
rule (1) or (3). Then by induction hypothesis we have ζ1σ↓ ∈
StOka(φ) ∪ {Σ0Oka}, and since the applied rule is a subterm rule
then
M ∈ StOka(ζ2σ↓) ⊆ StOka(φ) ∪ {Σ0Oka}, thus we conclude. If
the rule (2) is applied, this case cannot appear because this implies
head(ζ2σ↓) = tdcommit, thus by equational theory ζMσ cannot re-
duced, contradiction.
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– If ζ2σ↓ is obtained by the rule (4), i.e. ζ2 = f1(ζ
′
1, ζ
′
2, ζ
′
3, ζ
′
4). This
case cannot appear by minimality of ζM , indeed ζ
′
4 will be smaller
than ζM . If the rule (4) is applied, then we have ζM = f1(ζ1, ζ2, ζ3, ζ4). Since ζMσ
is reduced to its normal form then head(ζ2σ↓) = f1 and ζ1σ↓, ζ3σ↓ ∈
StOka(ζ2σ↓) and since ζ4σ↓ ∈ StOka(ζMσ↓), thus it is sufficient to prove
that ζ2σ↓ ∈ StOka(φ,M). We distinguish several cases for ζ2:
– ζ2 is a variable, then ζ2σ↓ ∈ StOka(φ), and since the applied rule is a
subterm rule then M ∈ StOka(ζ2σ↓) ⊆ StOka(φ), thus we conclude.
– ζ2 = f1(ζ
′
1, ζ
′
2, ζ
′
3, ζ
′
4) is by composition. This case cannot appear
by minimality of ζM because we have always f1(ζ
′
1, ζ
′
2, ζ
′
3, ζ4) smaller
than ζM .
– ζ2 = g(ζ
′
1, . . . , ζ
′
k) and g(ζ
′
1σ↓, . . . , ζ
′
kσ↓) is in normal form with g 6=
f1, this case cannot appear because this implies that ζMσ cannot
reduced, contradiction.
– ζ2 = g(ζ
′
1, . . . , ζ
′
k) and g(ζ
′
1σ↓, . . . , ζ
′
kσ↓)
h
−→ ζ1σ↓ by applying the
rule (1) or (3). Then by induction hypothesis we have ζ2σ↓ ∈
StOka(φ) ∪ {Σ0Oka}, and since the applied rule is a subterm rule
then
M ∈ StOka(ζ2σ↓) ⊆ StOka(φ) ∪ {Σ0Oka}, thus we conclude. If
the rule (2) is applied, this case cannot appear because this implies
head(ζ2σ↓) = tdcommit, thus by equational theory ζMσ cannot re-
duced, contradiction.
– If ζ2σ↓ is obtained by the rule (4), i.e. ζ2 = f1(ζ′1, ζ
′
2, ζ
′
3, ζ
′
4). This case
is impossible by minimality of ζM , because we have f1(ζ
′
1, ζ
′
2, ζ
′
3, ζ4)
smaller than ζM . 
A.3 Decidability result for ⊢E under the two theories
Proof of proposition 2.
Proof of the first part:
(→) Let M ′ ∈ StE(φ,M) and φ ⊢E M ′, then by lemma 1 there exists a local
recipe ζM ′ of M
′ s.t for all ζ′ ∈ StOka(ζM ), for all ζ′′ ∈ StE(ζ′) we have
ζ′′σ↓ ∈ StE(φ, ζ
′σ↓). We prove by induction on the size of ζM ′ that there exists
(M ′, ζM ′) ∈ T with ζM ′ is a recipe of M
′ computed by the algorithm.
Base case: If ζM ′ is a variable or a name, then by instruction 1 we have
(M ′, ζM ′ ) ∈ T (with ζM ′ is the variable chosen by the algorithm).
Inductive step: Let ζM ′ = f(ζ1, . . . , ζn). Since ζiσ↓ ∈ StE(φ,M ′) (be-
cause ζM ′ is local) and as consequence ζiσ↓ ∈ StE(φ,M) because M
′ ∈
StE(φ,M), then by induction hypothesis we have ((ζiσ)↓, ζi) ∈ T for
i = 1..n, with ζi are the recipes of (ζiσ)↓ computed by the algorithm,
thus: If ζM ′σ↓ == f(ζ1σ↓, . . . , ζnσ↓), then by the instruction 3 of the
Algorithm 1 we have (M ′, ζM ′) ∈ T (with ζM ′ = f(ζ1, . . . , ζn)).
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in normal form then by lemma 4 (or lemma 5) we have f(ζ1σ↓, . . . , ζnσ↓)
h
−→
M ′. Then by the instruction 2 of the Algorithm 1 we have (M ′, ζM ′) ∈
T (with ζM ′ = f(ζ1, . . . , ζn)).
(←) If there exists a pair (M ′, ζM ′) ∈ T , then (by construction of T ) we have
ζM ′σ =E M
′ and fn(ζM ′) ∩ ñ = ∅, thus by proposition 1 we have φ ⊢E M
′.
Proof of the second part:
Let M ′ ∈ StE(φ,M) s.t φ ⊢E M ′. Consider ζM ′ a minimal local recipe of M ′.
We proceed by induction on the size of ζM ′ that (M
′, ζM ′) is computed by the
algorithm, i.e (M ′, ζM ′ ) ∈ T . This will prove that recipes computed by the
algorithm are local.
Base case: If ζM ′ is a variable or a name, then by instruction 1 we have
(M ′, ζM ′) ∈ T .
Inductive step: Let ζM ′ = f(ζ1, . . . , ζn). Since ζiσ↓ ∈ StE(φ,M ′) (be-
cause ζM ′ is local) and as consequence ζiσ↓ ∈ StE(φ,M) because M ′ ∈
StE(φ,M), moreover by minimality of ζM ′ , the ζi are minimal local recipes.
Then by induction hypothesis we have ((ζiσ)↓, ζi) ∈ T for i = 1..n, thus: If ζM ′σ↓ == f(ζ1σ↓, . . . , ζnσ↓), then by the instruction 3 of the
Algorithm 1 we have (M ′, ζM ′ ) ∈ T . If f(ζ1σ↓, . . . , ζnσ↓) is not in normal form. Since ζ1σ↓, . . . , ζnσ↓ are
in normal form then by lemma 4 (or lemma 5) we have f(ζ1σ↓, . . . , ζnσ↓)
h
−→
M ′. Then by the instruction 2 of the Algorithm 1 we have (M ′, ζM ′) ∈
T .

Proof of Proposition 3.
Let T be the set computed by the Algorithm 1. The set T is obtained in at
most |φ|dag + |M |dag steps. At each step, we compute: Every closed term of the form f(M1, . . . ,Mk), where (Mi, ζi) are already
in the set T . For each such term, we check whether it is an instance of some
left-hand side of a rule. Thus we need at most O((|φ|dag + |M |dag)ar(Σ)+1)
computations. Every closed term of the form f(M1, . . . ,Mk) that is also in StE(φ,M),
where (Mi, ζi) are already in the set T . In other words, for every term
of the form f(M1, . . . ,Mk) in StE(φ,M) (at most |φ|dag + |M |dag terms),
we check whether each (Mi, ζi) is already in the set T . Thus we need at
most O((|φ|dag + |M |dag)2) computations.
Since 1 ≤ ar(Σ), each step requires at most O((|φ|dag + |M |dag)ar(Σ)+1) com-
putations and since there are at most |φ|dag + |M |dag steps, then T may be
computed in time O((|φ|dag + |M |dag)
ar(Σ)+2). It remains to check if there exits
a pair (M, ζM ) ∈ T (at most |φ|dag + |M |dag comparison), thus for deciding
φ ⊢E M we need at most O((|φ|dag + |M |dag)ar(Σ)+2).
For the second part of Proposition 3 we know by locality lemma that if φ ⊢E M
then there exists a local recipe ζM such that fn(ζM )∩ñ = ∅, ζMσ =E M and for
every ζ′′ ∈ StE(ζM ) we have ζ′′σ↓ ∈ StE(φ,M). Thus, the maximal DAG-size
of ζM is |φ|dag + |M |dag. 
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B Proofs of Section 5
B.1 Proofs under Lee et al theory
Proof of proposition 4.
The set satLee(φ) is computed in at most |φ|dag steps. At each step we need at
most (by proposition 3) O((|φ|dag + |φ|dag)
ar(ΣLee)+2), then we conclude that
satLee(φ) is computed in time O(|φ|
ar(ΣLee)+3
dag ). The set ILee(φ) is obtained as
follows:
For each term of the form penc(M1,M2,M3) with Mi ∈ satLee(φ) (at most
|satLee(φ)|
cELee
dag ≤ |φ|
cELee
dag terms), and for each subterm of a such term (at most
cELee |φ|dag terms), we check whether it is deducible (by Proposition 3 we need at
most O((|φ|dag + cELee |φ|dag)
ar(Σ)+2)). Thus we need at most O(|φ|
2cELee+3
dag ).
Then we conclude that the set satLee(φ) ∪ ILee(φ) can be computed in time
O(|φ|
2cELee+3
dag ).
For the second part of Proposition, we know by Proposition 3, that for
each deducible term M there exists a term ζM such that fn(ζM ) ∩ ñ = ∅,
ζMσ =ELee M and |ζM |dag ≤ |φ|dag + |M |dag. Thus the maximal DAG-size of a
term in satLee(φ) ∪ I(φ) is |φ|dag(cELee + 1). 
For proving the decidability result for static equivalence, we need some ad-
ditional results.
Proposition 6 Let φ = νñσ be a frame in normal form, M be a deducible term
in normal form s.t M == f(M1, . . . ,Mk), f 6= penc and M /∈ satLee(φ). For
every local recipe ζM of M , we have ζM = f(ζM1 , . . . , ζMk) such that ζMσ↓ ==
f(ζM1σ↓, . . . , ζMkσ↓) (i.e ζM is by composition).
Proof. Let ζM be a local recipe of deducible term M in normal form such that
M == f(M1, . . . ,Mk), f 6= penc and M /∈ satLee(φ). We distinguish several
cases according to ζM . If ζM is a variable, this case is impossible because this
implies M ∈ satLee(φ), else :
Let ζM = g(ζ1, . . . , ζk) and ζiσ↓ = Ni. If g(N1, . . . , Nk) is in normal form, thus g = f , Ni = Mi and we conclude, If g(N1, . . . , Nk) is not in normal form, sinceN1, . . . , Nk are in normal form
then by lemma 4 we have g(N1, . . . , Nk)
h
−→ M . This case is impossible
because this implies M ∈ satLee(φ). Indeed, since it does not exist a
rewrite rule L→ R such that head(R) = f (since we consider f 6= penc),
then M can only be obtained form subterm rule. So, by locality lemma
we have M ∈ StLee(φ) and by Definition 3 we have M ∈ satLee(φ) since
M is deducible, contradiction. 
Proposition 7 Let φ = νñσ be a frame in normal form, ζM = rencrypt(ζM1 , ζM2)
be a local recipe of M == penc(N1, N2, N3) s.t ζMσ↓ = M and M /∈ satLee(φ),
with (ζMi)i=1,2 are the local recipes of some terms Mi s.t ζMiσ↓ = Mi. If Ni are
deducible and Ni /∈ satLee(φ) for some i ∈ {1, 2}, then there exits a deducible
term N ′3 such that N3 = f0(N
′
3,M2) and penc(ζN1 , ζN2 , f0(ζN ′3 , ζM2)) =ELee ζM ,
with (ζNi)i=1,2, ζN ′3 are the locale recipes of Ni, N
′
3 s.t ζNiσ↓ = Ni and ζN ′3σ↓ =
N ′3.
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Proof. We proceed by induction on the size of ζM .
Base case: ζM is a variable, then ζMσ ∈ φ, contradiction.
Inductive step: Since by equational theory we have M1 == penc(N1, N2, N
′
3)
with N ′3 ∈ StLee(N3), and Ni /∈ satLee(φ) for some i ∈ {1, 2}, thus M1 /∈
satLee(φ), because if M1 ∈ satLee(φ), and since Ni are deducible subterms of
M1, then Ni ∈ StLee(φ) and by Definition 3 we have Ni ∈ satLee(φ) for every
i ∈ {1, 2}, contradiction. So, we distinguish several cases according to ζM1 : ζM1 is a variable, this case is impossible because this impliesM1 ∈ satLee(φ),
contradiction. ζM1 = f(ζ1, . . . , ζk) and f(ζ1σ↓, . . . , ζkσ↓) is in normal form (ζM1 is by
composition). Thus ζM1 = penc(ζN ′1 , ζN ′2 , ζN ′3) with ζN ′i are the local
recipes of some terms N ′i s.t ζN ′iσ↓ = N
′
i for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. By equa-
tional theory we have N ′i = Ni for i = 1, 2 and we have N
′
3 ∈ StLee(N3).
Thus we have
rencrypt(penc(ζN1 , ζN2 , ζN ′3), ζM2) =ELee penc(ζN1 , ζN2 , f0(ζN ′3 , ζM2)). ζM1 = f(ζ1, . . . , ζk) and f(ζ1σ↓, . . . , ζkσ↓) is not in normal form.
Since ζ1σ↓, . . . , ζkσ↓ are in normal form then by lemma 4 we have
f(ζ1σ↓, . . . , ζkσ↓)
h
−→ M1. If f 6= rencrypt, then M1 can only obtained
by applying the rule (1), (2), (3), (5), (6) or (7), this case is impossible
because by locality this implies M1 ∈ StLee(φ)∪{ok}, and by Definition 3
M1 ∈ satLee(φ). Else, in this case we have ζM1 = rencrypt(ζM ′1 , ζM ′2) with
ζM ′
i
are the local recipes of some terms M ′i s.t ζM ′iσ↓ = M
′
i .
By induction hypothesis there exists a deducible term N ′′3 such that N
′
3 =
f0(N
′′
3 ,M
′
2) and ζM1 =ELee penc(ζN1 , ζN2 , f0(ζN ′′3 , ζM ′2)), so we have ζM =ELee
rencrypt(ζM1 , ζM2 ) = penc(ζN1 , ζN2 , f0(f0(ζN ′′3 , ζM ′2), ζM2 )) with
ζN ′
3
= f0(ζN ′′
3
, ζM ′
2
), thus we conclude. 
Proof of Lemma 2.
Assume that φ′ |= EqELee(φ) and consider ζM , ζN such that (ζM =ELee ζN )φ
and (fn(ζM ) ∪ fn(ζN )) ∩ ñ = ∅. Let us show that (ζM =ELee ζN )φ
′. Let
T = ζMσ↓.
We show by induction on the max of the size of ζM and ζN .
- Base case: ζM , ζN are variables, so (ζM , ζN ) ∈ EqELee(φ), and we conclude
by φ′ |= EqELee(φ).
- Inductive step: We distinguish two cases:
Case 1 : T ∈ satLee(φ): If neither ζM nor ζN is a variable, then we rewrite ζM = ζN in f(ζ1, . . . , ζk) =
g(ζ′1, . . . , ζ
′
n). Let ζi, ζ
′
i be the local recipes of ζiσ↓, ζ
′
iσ↓ that belong to
EqELee(φ). By locality we have ζiσ↓, ζ
′
iσ↓ ∈ StLee(φ, T ) ⊆ StLee(φ) (since
T ∈ satLee(φ)), then by Definition 3 we have ζiσ↓, ζ′iσ↓ ∈ satLee(φ).
Thus we have (f(ζ1, . . . , ζk) = g(ζ
′
1, . . . , ζ
′
n)) ∈ EqELee(φ), and we de-
duce (f(ζ1, . . . , ζk) =ELee g(ζ
′
1, . . . , ζ
′
n))φ
′ by φ′ |= EqELee(φ). More-
over, by induction hypothesis we have (ζi =ELee ζi)φ
′ and (ζ′i =ELee ζ
′
i)φ
′,
then we have (f(ζ1, . . . , ζk) =ELee f(ζ1, . . . , ζk))φ
′ and (g(ζ′1, . . . , ζ
′
n) =ELee
g(ζ′1, . . . , ζ
′
n))φ
′. Thus we conclude by transitivity. If ζM or ζN is a variable, let us say ζM = f(ζ1, . . . , ζk) and ζN = x.
We rewrite ζM = ζN in f(ζ1, . . . , ζk) = x. Let ζi be the local recipes
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of ζiσ↓ that belong to EqELee(φ). Thus we have (f(ζ1, . . . , ζk) = x) ∈
EqELee(φ), and we deduce (f(ζ1, . . . , ζk) =ELee x)φ
′ by φ′ |= EqELee(φ).
Moreover, by induction hypothesis we have (ζi =ELee ζi)φ
′, then we have
(f(ζ1, . . . , ζk) =ELee f(ζ1, . . . , ζk))φ
′. Thus we conclude by transitivity.
Case 2 : T /∈ satLee(φ): This implies that neither ζM or ζN are variables. We
distinguish several cases : If ζM and ζN are terms by composition: We rewrite ζM = ζN in
g(ζ1, . . . , ζn) = g(ζ
′
1, . . . , ζ
′
n). Since (ζM =ELee ζN )φ then we have
g(ζ1σ↓, . . . , ζnσ↓) == g(ζ′1σ↓, . . . , ζ′nσ↓). So we have ζiσ↓ == ζ
′
iσ↓, thus
(ζi =ELee ζ
′
i)φ. Then by induction hypothesis we have (ζi =ELee ζ
′
i)φ
′.
Since =ELee is closed by application of function symbol, we conclude that
(ζM =ELee ζN )φ
′. If ζM and ζN are terms by decomposition: we rewrite ζM = ζN in
f(ζ1, . . . , ζk) = g(ζ
′
1, . . . , ζ
′
l). If the rule (1), (2), (3), (5), (6) or (7) is
applied, then by locality we have T ∈ StLee(φ)∪{ok} and by Definition 3
we obtain T ∈ satLee(φ), contradiction. Thus the interesting case is when
the rule (4) is applied. So we rewrite ζM = ζN in rencrypt(ζ1, ζ2) =
rencrypt(ζ′1, ζ
′
2). Since (ζM =ELee ζN )φ then we have ζMσ↓ == ζNσ↓ ==
T with T of the form penc(T1, T2, f0(T3, T4)) where Ti are in normal
form. By the equational theory we have ζ1σ↓ == penc(T1, T2, T3)(i.1)
and ζ2σ↓ == T4(i.2). Moreover, we have ζ′1σ↓ == penc(T1, T2, T3)(ii.1)
and ζ′2σ↓ == T4(ii.2). By (i.1) and (ii.1) we have (ζ1 =ELee ζ
′
1)φ and
by (i.2) and (ii.2) we have (ζ2 =ELee ζ
′
2)φ. Then by induction hypothesis
we have (ζ1 =ELee ζ
′
1)φ
′ and (ζ2 =ELee ζ
′
2)φ
′. Since =ELee is closed by
application of function symbol , we conclude that (ζM =ELee ζN )φ
′. If ζM is a term by decomposition and ζN is a term by composition (or the
inverse) : we rewrite ζM = ζN in
f(ζ1, . . . , ζk) = g(ζ
′
1, . . . , ζ
′
l). Like in previous case, if the rule (1), (2), (3),
(5), (6) or (7) is applied, then by locality we have T ∈ StLee(φ)∪{ok} and
by Definition 3 we obtain T ∈ satLee(φ), contradiction. Thus the inter-
esting case for the term by decomposition is when the rule (4) is applied.
So we rewrite ζM = ζN in rencrypt(ζ1, ζ2) = penc(ζ
′
1, ζ
′
2, ζ
′
3).
In what follows, let (ζiσ↓ = Mi)i=1,2 and (ζ′iσ↓ = Ni)i=1,2,3.
- If Ni ∈ satLee(φ) for i = 1, 2, 3, since M2 is deducible and we have M2 ∈
StLee(φ) (because M2 ∈ StLee(N3) and N3 ∈ satLee(φ)) then by Defi-
nition 3 M2 ∈ satLee(φ). Moreover, since M1 ∈ StLee(penc(N1, N2, N3))
and it is deducible then by Definition 4 M1 ∈ ILee(φ). Let ζi, ζ
′
i be the lo-
cal recipes ofMi, Ni belonging toEqELee(φ), thus we have (rencrypt(ζ1, ζ2) =
penc(ζ′1, ζ
′
2, ζ
′
3)) ∈ EqELee(φ), and we deduce
(rencrypt(ζ1, ζ2) =ELee penc(ζ
′
1, ζ
′
2, ζ
′
3))φ
′ by φ′ |= EqELee(φ). More-
over, by induction hypothesis we have (ζi =ELee ζi)φ
′ and (ζ′i =ELee ζ
′
i)φ
′.
Thus, since =ELee is stable by application of function symbol, we have
(rencrypt(ζ1, ζ2) =ELee rencrypt(ζ1, ζ2))φ
′ and
(penc(ζ′1, ζ
′
2, ζ
′
3) =ELee penc(ζ
′
1, ζ
′
2, ζ
′
3))φ
′. Thus we conclude by transi-
tivity.
- Else, we distinguish two cases:
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– If N3 /∈ satLee(φ), since (ζM =ELee ζN )φ then by equational theory
N3 is of the form f0(N4, N5), and as ζ
′
3 is local, so by proposition 6 ζN3
can only be of the form f0(ζ
′
4, ζ
′
5) (i.e it is by composition). So we can
rewrite ζM = ζN in rencrypt(ζ1, ζ2) = penc(ζ
′
1, ζ
′
2, f0(ζ
′
4, ζ
′
5)). Since
(ζM =ELee ζN )φ, then (ζ1 =ELee penc(ζ
′
1, ζ
′
2, ζ
′
4))φ and (ζ2 =ELee
ζ′5)φ. Then by induction hypothesis we have (ζ1 =ELee penc(ζ
′
1, ζ
′
2, ζ
′
4))φ
′
and (ζ′2 =ELee ζ
′
5)φ
′, and we conclude.
– If Ni /∈ satLee(φ) for some i ∈ {1, 2}, then by proposition 7, there ex-
ists deducibleN ′3 s.tN3 = f0(N
′
3,M2), ζM =ELee penc(ζN1 , ζN2 , f0(ζN ′3 , ζ2))
with ζN ′
3
σ↓ = N ′3 and ζN ′iσ↓ = Ni for i = 1, 2. So it is sufficient to
prove that (penc(ζN ′
1
, ζN ′
2
, f0(ζN ′
3
, ζ2)) =ELee penc(ζ
′
1, ζ
′
2, ζ
′
3))φ
′, and
since penc(ζN ′
1
σ↓, ζN ′
2
σ↓, (f0(ζN ′
3
, ζ2))σ↓) is in normal form (because
by lemma 4 the reduction must be in head and moreover does not
exists a rewrite rule L→ R s.t head(L) = penc), thus we can proceed
like in the first case where the two terms are by composition. 
The next lemma is adapted from the lemma 2 of [AC04].
Lemma 6 Let φ = νñσ be a frame in normal form. For every context C s.t
fn(C) ∩ ñ = ∅, for every Mi ∈ satE(φ), if C[M1, . . . ,Mk]
h
−→ T by applying
syntactic subterm rule3, then for every frame φ′ |= EqE(φ) such that φ′ = νñ′σ′
and fn(C)∩ñ′ = ∅, (C[ζM1 , . . . , ζMk ] =E ζT )φ
′ with ζMi , ζT are the local recipes
of Mi, T .
Proof. Since the reduction is in head, then C[M1, . . . ,Mk] is an instance Lθ of
some term L, where L→ R is a syntactic subterm rule.
We rewrite Lθ in C′′0 [C
0
1 [M1, . . . ,Mk], . . . , C
0
n[M1, . . . ,Mk],M1, . . . ,Mk] such
that L is an instance of C′′0 [x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yl] and for every path p in C
′′
0 ,
leading to a variable xi, L|p = xi, for every path p in C′′0 , leading to a variable
yi, Lθ|p = Mi ∈ satLee(φ): C′′0 is the maximal context such that L and C4 are
instances of C′′0 .
We transform again Lθ in order to obtain a context of terms of satLee(φ) , such
that the context is of the size smaller than cELee(ELee). For each variable xi of
C′′0 : Either this variable is tested for equality under some yj : there exists a
path p = p1.p2 such that C
′′
0 |p1 = yj and L|p1.p2 = xi. In this case, we
defined M ′′i
def
= xiθ. Then M
′′
i = C
0
i [M1, . . . ,Mk] and is a subterm of Mj,
and since M ′′i is deducible, thus by Definition 3, we have M
′′
i ∈ satLee(φ). Either this variable is unconstrained in L: for every path p in L such that
L|p = xi, p is a path in C′′0 and C
′′
0 |p = xi.
By renaming the variables in L and C′′0 , we may assume that x1, . . . , xr, are
unconstrained in L and xr+1, . . . , xn are tested for equality under some variables.
We obtain that:
Lθ == C′′0 [C
0
1 [M1, . . . ,Mk], . . . , C
0
r [M1, . . . ,Mk],M
′′
r+1, . . . ,M
′′
n ,M1, . . . ,Mk],
with Mi,M
′′
i ∈ satLee(φ).
3A rule l → r is a syntactic subterm rule if r is a syntactic subterm of l or a constant
symbol.
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We have to consider three cases depending on the form of Rθ, which is a subterm
of Lθ or a constant symbol. Either Rθ is of the form:
C′′′0 [C
0
1 [M1, . . . ,Mk], . . . , C
0
r [M1, . . . ,Mk],M
′′
r+1, . . . ,M
′′
n ,M1, . . . ,Mk]
for some context C′′′0 of small size. Since Lθ
h
−→ Rθ and since the variables
x1, . . . , xr are unconstrained, we also have
C′′0 [a1, . . . , ar,M
′′
r+1, . . . ,M
′′
n ,M1, . . . ,Mk]
h
−→
C′′′0 [a1, . . . , ar,M
′′
r+1, . . . ,M
′′
n ,M1, . . . ,Mk] where ai’s a fresh names. Thus
(C′′0 [a1, . . . , ar, ζM ′′r+1 , . . . , ζM ′′n , ζM1 , . . . , ζMk ] =ELee
C′′′0 [a1, . . . , ar, ζM ′′r+1 , . . . , ζM ′′n , ζM1 , . . . , ζMk ])φ. Let ζM ′′i , ζMi be the lo-
cal recipes of ζM ′′
i
σ↓, ζMiσ↓ belonging to Eq(φ). By lemma 2, we have
(ζM ′′
i
= ζM ′′
i
)φ′ and (ζMi = ζMi)φ
′, thus we have
(C′′0 [a1, . . . , ar, ζM ′′r+1 , . . . , ζM ′′n , ζM1 , . . . , ζMk ] =ELee
C′′0 [a1, . . . , ar, ζM ′′
r+1
, . . . , ζM ′′
n
, ζM1 , . . . , ζMk ])φ
′ and
(C′′′0 [a1, . . . , ar, ζM ′′r+1 , . . . , ζM ′′n , ζM1 , . . . , ζMk ] =ELee
C′′′0 [a1, . . . , ar, ζM ′′
r+1
, . . . , ζM ′′
n
, ζM1 , . . . , ζMk ])φ
′. Moreover we have,
(C′′0 [a1, . . . , ar, ζM ′′
r+1
, . . . , ζM ′′
n
, ζM1 , . . . , ζMk ] =ELee
C′′′0 [a1, . . . , ar, ζM ′′
r+1
, . . . , ζM ′′
n
, ζM1 , . . . , ζMk ])φ
′, because it belongs to Eq(φ)
(since C′′0 and C
′′′
0 are small contexts), then, by transitivity we deduce
(C′′0 [a1, . . . , ar, ζM ′′r+1 , . . . , ζM ′′n , ζM1 , . . . , ζMk ] =ELee
C′′′0 [a1, . . . , ar, ζM ′′r+1 , . . . , ζM ′′n , ζM1 , . . . , ζMk ])φ
′. So we conclude by re-
placing each ai by C
0
i [ζM1 , . . . , ζMk ]. Either Rθ is a subterm M0 of one of the Mi or M ′′i . Since the variables
x1, . . . , xr are unconstrained, we also have
C′′0 [a1, . . . , ar,M
′′
r+1, . . . ,M
′′
n ,M1, . . . ,Mk]
h
−→M0,
where ai’s a fresh names. Since M0 is deducible, then by Definition 3, we
have M0 ∈ satLee(φ). Thus
(C′′0 [a1, . . . , ar, ζM ′′r+1 , . . . , ζM ′′n , ζM1 , . . . , ζMk ] =ELee ζM0)φ.
Thus, we conclude like the previous case. Either Rθ is a constant symbol. We conclude like the case above. 
Proof of Lemma 3.
We proceed by induction on the size of ζM .
- Base case: If ζM is a variable, then we can choose ζ̂M = ζM , thus we have
(ζM =ELee ζ̂M )φ
′.
- Inductive step: Let ζM = f(ζ1, . . . , ζn). Applying the induction hypothesis,
there exists ζ̂i local recipes of (ζi)σ↓ such that (ζi =ELee ζ̂i)φ
′. Since =ELee
is closed by application of function symbol, then we have (f(ζ̂1, . . . , ζ̂n) =ELee
ζM )φ
′(*). We distinguish two cases:
Case 1 : ζM is by composition. Then we have the term f(ζ̂1, . . . , ζ̂n) is local
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recipe of M (see proof of locality lemma). Then we can choose f(ζ̂1, . . . , ζ̂n) for
a local recipe of M .
Case 2 : ζM = f(ζ1, . . . , ζn) is by decomposition : If f = rencrypt, in this
case we have rencrypt(ζ̂1, ζ̂2) is local (see proof of locality lemma), thus we can
proceed like in previous case, else (in this case f(ζ̂1, . . . , ζ̂n) is not always local);
we rewrite f(ζ̂1, . . . , ζ̂n) in C[ζ̂M1 , . . . , ζ̂Mk ] such that C[M1, . . . ,Mk]
h
−→ M ′
and Mi ∈ satLee(φ). By lemma 6 we have (ζ̂M ′ =ELee C[ζ̂M1 , . . . , ζ̂Mk ])φ
′(**),
with ζ̂M ′ is local recipe of M because ELee is convergent. Thus we deduce by
transitivity from (*) and (**) that (ζM =ELee ζ̂M ′)φ
′. Then we can choose ζ̂M ′
for a local recipe of M . 
B.2 Proofs under Okamoto theory
Proof of Lemma 2.
Assume that φ′ |= EqEOka (φ) and consider ζM , ζN such that (ζM =EOka ζN )φ
and (fn(ζM ) ∪ fn(ζN )) ∩ ñ = ∅. Let us show that (ζM =EOka ζN )φ
′. Let
T = ζMσ↓.
We show by induction on the max of the size of ζM and ζN .
- Base case: ζM , ζN are variables, so (ζM , ζN ) ∈ EqEOka(φ), and we conclude
by φ′ |= EqEOka(φ).
- Inductive step: We distinguish two cases:
Case 1 : T ∈ satOka(φ): If neither ζM nor ζN is a variable, then we rewrite ζM = ζN in f(ζ1, . . . , ζk) =
g(ζ′1, . . . , ζ
′
n). Let ζi, ζ
′
i be the local recipes of ζiσ↓, ζ
′
iσ↓ that belong to
EqEOka(φ). By locality we have ζiσ↓, ζ
′
iσ↓ ∈ StOka(φ, T ) ⊆ StOka(φ)
(since T ∈ satOka(φ)), then by Definition 3 we have ζiσ↓, ζ′iσ↓ ∈ satOka(φ).
Thus we have (f(ζ1, . . . , ζk) = g(ζ
′
1, . . . , ζ
′
n)) ∈ EqEOka(φ), and we de-
duce (f(ζ1, . . . , ζk) =EOka g(ζ
′
1, . . . , ζ
′
n))φ
′ by φ′ |= EqEOka (φ). More-
over, by induction hypothesis we have (ζi =EOka ζi)φ
′ and (ζ′i =EOka
ζ′i)φ
′, then we have (f(ζ1, . . . , ζk) =EOka f(ζ1, . . . , ζk))φ
′ and (g(ζ′1, . . . , ζ
′
n) =EOka
g(ζ′1, . . . , ζ
′
n))φ
′. Thus we conclude by transitivity. If ζM or ζN is a variable, let us say ζM = f(ζ1, . . . , ζk) and ζN = x.
We rewrite ζM = ζN in f(ζ1, . . . , ζk) = x. Let ζi be the local recipes
of ζiσ↓ that belong to EqEOka(φ). Thus we have (f(ζ1, . . . , ζk) = x) ∈
EqEOka(φ), and we deduce (f(ζ1, . . . , ζk) =EOka x)φ
′ by φ′ |= EqEOka(φ).
Moreover, by induction hypothesis we have (ζi =EOka ζi)φ
′, then we have
(f(ζ1, . . . , ζk) =EOka f(ζ1, . . . , ζk))φ
′. Thus we conclude by transitivity.
Case 2 : T /∈ satOka(φ): This implies that neither ζM or ζN are variables.
We distinguish several several cases: In what follows, we consider ζiσ↓ = Mi
and ζ′iσ↓ = Ni. If ζM and ζN are terms by composition: We rewrite ζM = ζN in
g(ζ1, . . . , ζn) = g(ζ
′
1, . . . , ζ
′
n). Since (ζM =EOka ζN )φ then we have
g(ζ1σ↓, . . . , ζnσ↓) == g(ζ′1σ↓, . . . , ζ′nσ↓). So we have ζiσ↓ == ζ
′
iσ↓, thus
(ζi =EOka ζ
′
i)φ. Then by induction hypothesis we have (ζi =EOka ζ
′
i)φ
′.
Since =EOka is closed by application of function symbol, we conclude that
(ζM =EOka ζN )φ
′.
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inverse) : we rewrite ζM = ζN in
f(ζ1, . . . , ζk) = g(ζ
′
1, . . . , ζ
′
l). If the rule (1), (2) or (3) is applied, then
by locality we have T ∈ StOka(φ) and by Definition 3 we obtain T ∈
satOka(φ). Thus the interesting case for the term by decomposition is
when the rule (4) is applied. So we rewrite ζM = ζN in f1(ζ1, ζ2, ζ3, ζ4) =
f1(ζ
′
1, ζ
′
2, ζ
′
3, ζ
′
4).
Since (ζM =EOka ζN )φ, then we have M2 == f1(N1, N2, N3,M1). More-
over, by equational theory we have
(tdcommit(ζ1, ζ2, ζ3)σ)↓ == tdcommit(N1, N2, N3) and ζ4σ↓ == ζ′4σ↓, so
we have (tdcommit(ζ1, ζ2, ζ3) =EOka tdcommit(ζ
′
1, ζ
′
2, ζ
′
3))φ and (ζ4 =EOka
ζ′4)φ. Applying induction hypothesis (since tdcommit(ζ1, ζ2, ζ3) and ζ4
(resp. tdcommit(ζ′1, ζ
′
2, ζ
′
3) and ζ
′
4) are subterms of ζM (resp. ζN )), we
obtain
(tdcommit(ζ1, ζ2, ζ3) =EOka tdcommit(ζ
′
1, ζ
′
2, ζ
′
3))φ
′ and (ζ4 =EOka ζ
′
4)φ
′,
thus we conclude that (ζM =EOka ζN )φ
′ . If ζM and ζN are terms by decomposition: we rewrite ζM = ζN in
f(ζ1, . . . , ζk) = g(ζ
′
1, . . . , ζ
′
l). If the rule (1), (2) or (3) is applied, then
by locality we have T ∈ StOka(φ) and by Definition 3 we obtain T ∈
satOka(φ). Thus the interesting case is when the rule (4) is applied. So
we rewrite ζM = ζN in f1(ζ1, ζ2, ζ3, ζ4) = f1(ζ
′
1, ζ
′
2, ζ
′
3, ζ
′
4).
Since (ζM =EOka ζN )φ, then we have ζMσ↓ == ζNσ↓ == T with T of
the form f1(T1, T2, T3, T4) where Ti are in normal form. By equational
theory we have (tdcommit(ζ1, ζ2, ζ3)σ)↓ == tdcommit(T1, T2, T3) (i.1)
and ζ4σ↓ == T4 (i.2). Moreover, we have (tdcommit(ζ′1, ζ
′
2, ζ
′
3)σ)↓ ==
tdcommit(T1, T2, T3) (ii.1) and ζ
′
4σ↓ == T4 (ii.2). By (i.1) and (ii.1) we
have
(tdcommit(ζ1, ζ2, ζ3) =EOka tdcommit(ζ
′
1, ζ
′
2, ζ
′
3))φ, and by (i.2) and (ii.2)
we have (ζ4 =EOka ζ
′
4)φ. Applying induction hypothesis (since tdcommit(ζ1, ζ2, ζ3)
and ζ4 (resp. tdcommit(ζ
′
1, ζ
′
2, ζ
′
3) and ζ
′
4) are subterms of ζM (resp.
ζN )), we obtain (tdcommit(ζ1, ζ2, ζ3) =EOka tdcommit(ζ
′
1, ζ
′
2, ζ
′
3))φ
′ and
(ζ4 =EOka ζ
′
4)φ
′, thus we conclude that (ζM =EOka ζN )φ
′. 
Also for this theory, the Lemma 6 holds. Its proof is identical under Lee et
al theory.
Proof of Lemma 3.
We proceed by induction on the size of ζM .
- Base case: If ζM is a variable, then we can choose ζ̂M = ζM , thus we have
(ζM =EOka ζ̂M )φ
′.
- Inductive step: We distinguish two cases:
Case 1 : ζM = f(ζ1, . . . , ζn) is by composition: Applying the induction hypoth-
esis, there exist ζ̂i local recipes of (ζi)σ↓ s.t (ζi =EOka ζ̂i)φ
′. Then we have the
term f(ζ̂1, . . . , ζ̂n) is local recipe ofM (see proof of locality lemma). Since =EOka
is closed by application of function symbol, then we have (f(ζ̂1, . . . , ζ̂n) =EOka
ζM )φ
′. Then we can choose (f(ζ̂1, . . . , ζ̂n) for a local recipe of M .
Case 2 : ζM = f(ζ1, . . . , ζn) is by decomposition: Applying the induction
hypothesis, there exists ζ̂i local recipes of (ζi)σ↓ such that (ζi =EOka ζ̂i)φ
′, thus
we have (ζM =EOka f(ζ̂1, . . . , ζ̂n))φ
′(*) (because =EOka is closed by application
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of function symbol). If f(ζ̂1, . . . , ζ̂n) is local then we can proceed like above
case, else we distinguish several cases according to the applied rule: If the applied rule is the rule (1) or (3) (that is syntactic subterm rule),
then we rewrite f(ζ̂1, . . . , ζ̂n) in C[ζ̂M1 , . . . , ζ̂Mk ] such that C[M1, . . . ,Mk]
h
−→
M ′ andMi ∈ satOka(φ). By lemma 6 we have (ζ̂M ′ =EOka C[ζ̂M1 , . . . , ζ̂Mk ])φ
′,
with ζ̂M ′ is local recipe of M because EOka is convergent. Then we deduce
by transitivity from (*) and the last equations that (ζM =EOka ζ̂M ′)φ
′.
Thus we can choose ζ̂M ′ for a local recipe of M . If the applied rule is the rule (4), this implies n = 4 and f = f1.
Since ζM is by decomposition (i.e f1(ζ̂1σ↓, ζ̂2σ↓, ζ̂3σ↓, ζ̂4σ↓)
h
−→ M), then
head((ζ̂2σ)↓) = f1, ζ1σ↓, ζ3σ↓ ∈ StOka(ζ2σ↓) and ζ̂4σ↓ ∈ StOka(M). If
ζ̂2 is a variable or ζ̂2σ↓ is obtained by applying the rule (1) or (3) then
by locality we have ζ̂2σ↓ ∈ StOka(φ), then we have ζ̂iσ↓ ∈ StOka(φ) ⊆
StOka(φ,M) for i = 1..3, this implies that f1(ζ̂1, ζ̂2, ζ̂3, ζ̂4) is local (since ζ̂i
are local), contradiction. The rule (2) cannot be applied because give us
head((ζ̂2σ)↓) 6= f1. Thus ζ̂2 is either by composition with head(ζ̂2) =
f1 or by decomposition by applying the rule (4). So, we have ζ̂2 of
the form f1(ζ̂′1, ζ̂
′
2, ζ̂
′
3, ζ̂
′
4), thus (f1(ζ̂1, f1(ζ̂
′
1, ζ̂
′
2, ζ̂
′
3, ζ̂
′
4), ζ̂3, ζ̂4) =EOka
f1(ζ̂′1, ζ̂
′
2, ζ̂
′
3, ζ̂4))φ with (ζ̂1 =EOka ζ̂
′
4)φ and (ζ̂3 =EOka ζ̂
′
3)φ. By
lemma 2 we have (ζ̂1 =EOka ζ̂
′
4)φ
′ and (ζ̂3 =EOka ζ̂
′
3)φ
′, thus we de-
duce (f1(ζ̂1, f1(ζ̂′1, ζ̂
′
2, ζ̂
′
3, ζ̂
′
4), ζ̂3, ζ̂4) =EOka f1(ζ̂
′
1, ζ̂
′
2, ζ̂
′
3, ζ̂4))φ
′(**).
Let ζT = f1(ζ̂′1, ζ̂
′
2, ζ̂
′
3, ζ̂4). By induction hypothesis there exists local
recipe ζ̂T of (ζ̂Tσ)↓ s.t (ζT =EOka ζ̂T )φ
′(***). Then we conclude by tran-
sitivity from (*), (**) and (***) that (ζM =EOka ζ̂T )φ
′. Thus we can
choose ζ̂T for a local recipe of M . If the applied rule is the rule (4), this implies n = 3 and f = tdcommit.
Since ζM is by decomposition, then head((ζ̂2σ)↓) = f1 and ζ1σ↓, ζ3σ↓ ∈
StOka(ζ2σ↓). If ζ̂2 is a variable or ζ̂2σ↓ is obtained by applying the rule
(1) or (3) then by locality we have ζ̂2σ↓ ∈ StOka(φ), then we have ζ̂iσ↓ ∈
StOka(φ) ⊆ StOka(φ,M) for i = 1..3, this implies that tdcommit(ζ̂1, ζ̂2, ζ̂3)
is local (since ζ̂i are local), contradiction. The rule (2) cannot be applied
because give us head((ζ̂2σ)↓) 6= f1. Thus, ζ̂2 is either by composition with
head(ζ̂2) = f1 or by decomposition by applying the rule (4). So, we have
ζ̂2 of the form f1(ζ̂′1, ζ̂
′
2, ζ̂
′
3, ζ̂
′
4), thus
(tdcommit(ζ̂1, f1(ζ̂′1, ζ̂
′
2, ζ̂
′
3, ζ̂
′
4), ζ̂3) =EOka tdcommit(ζ̂
′
1, ζ̂
′
2, ζ̂
′
3))φ with
(ζ̂1 =EOka ζ̂
′
4)φ and (ζ̂3 =EOka ζ̂
′
3)φ. By lemma 2 we have (ζ̂1 =EOka
ζ̂′4)φ
′ and (ζ̂3 =EOka ζ̂
′
3)φ
′, thus we deduce
(tdcommit(ζ̂1, f1(ζ̂′1, ζ̂
′
2, ζ̂
′
3, ζ̂
′
4), ζ̂3) =EOka tdcommit(ζ̂
′
1, ζ̂
′
2, ζ̂
′
3))φ
′(**).
Let ζT = tdcommit(ζ̂′1, ζ̂
′
2, ζ̂
′
3). By induction hypothesis there exists lo-
cal recipe ζ̂T of (ζ̂Tσ)↓ s.t (ζT =EOka ζ̂T )φ
′(***). Then we conclude by
transitivity from (*), (**) and (***) that (ζM = ζ̂T )φ
′. Thus we can
choose ζ̂T for a local recipe of M . 
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